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Abstract
The subject of theoretical revision is the impairment of social cognition, which is well-
known in the clinics of borderline personality disorders. Mentalization is understood
as a form of social cognition, which allows to perceive, imagine and emotionally
relate, make sense and causality of what’s happening in a subjective world – of
self and another person. Mentalization supposes integration of contextual factors,
material and physical aspects of situation and behavior, as well as inner subjective
feelings, beliefs, goals and intentional states as representative motives for a given
behavior. In the perspective of the cultural-historical theory and methodology by L.S.
Vygotsky a new interpretation is offered for the clinical phenomena of mentalization
deficit, an understanding is given for transformation of its structure and functions as a
consequence of the person’s loss of interpsychic social connections and disintegration
of intrapsychic organization of consciousness, impairment of its systemic structure,
narrowing and simplification of cross-functional bonds and intrapsychic “mythology”.
In the result of this double destruction of bonds, ontogenetically early and primitive
forms of mentalization are «splitting off», isolated and start holding a domineering
position in psychic functioning. The process of mentalization regresses to its
pre-categorical and cognitive-affective non-differentiated levels and structures
(syncretic and complex organization), unfolding involuntarily and unconsciously,
lacking meaningful coherence, symbolic mediation and focus for understanding the
subjective world – of self and the Other. The unconscious substitution of the psychic
picture of the inner world with impulsive actions, hypochondriac and narcissistic
fixations, autistic pseudo-mentalization and manipulation is lacking the meaningful
and sanguineous dialogue with the Other. The loss of social connections (interpsychic
communication), without being mediated by the addressed to the Other speech-
dialogue is interiorized into the inner “muteness” – the loss of not only understanding
of others, but the interruption of meaningful inner and “worded” dialogue with the
self, self-understanding.
Keywords: mentalization disorders, cultural-historical approach, structure-functional
disorganization.
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1. Introduction
Ability of a person to consider one’s Self and the world of subjectivity of the Other
as subjects of inquiry implies an intricate interplay and interweaving of emotional
and reflexive processes, demands flexible decentering the Self to a position of an
imaginable other person, which is attainable only in the interpersonal communication,
open for the dialogue-meeting with the Other as a human being possessing equal
values and rights. The space between the Self and the Other, the space of the joint and
shared intersubjectivity and “collective intentionality” is viewed as a “place”, where
the “triangular” process of production of mutual mental representations unfolds [1].
Mental representation, or mentalization, as defined by a British psychoanalyst Peter
Fonagy, is understood as a form of social cognition, which allows perceiving, imagining,
emotionally relating, making sense and seeing causality in something taking place in
one’s own and other person’s subjective world. Mentalization implies integration of
contextual factors, material and physical aspects of situation and behavior, as well
as inner subjective feelings, beliefs, goals and intentional states as representative
incentives of various behaviors [2].
2. Methodology
According to the genetic method developed in the cultural-historical theory, we under-
stand mentalization impairment as a consequence of “regress” in systemic organiza-
tion of its microstructure and functions [3; 4; 5; 6; 7; 8; 9]. Ontogenetically preceding,
early and primitive forms of mentalizations “split out”, isolate themselves and start to
dominate in psychic functioning, while the process of mentalization itself regresses to
its pre-categorical levels, unfolding involuntarily and unconsciously. Such phenomena
are seen in altered states of consciousness, after severe psychic traumas, in personality
disorders.
3. Results
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3.1. Pre-categorical forms of subjectivity as a result of
collapse of categorical mediation and “simplification” of
structural organization of consciousness
The most prominent features of the form of mentalization deficit, which P. Fonagy
calls “psychic equivalence”, are the decrease in the regime of its functioning, which
manifests in excessive concretization and rigidity in understanding psychic states; a
belief that subjective representations absolutely accurately and univocally reflect real-
ity as its photographic copies; non-admission of alternative interpretations, lack of
ability to doubt the accuracy and limits of own thoughts; saturation of representations
with affects of paranoid hostility, idealization and grandiosity [10].
In the optics of cultural-historical theory, the described group of phenomena appears
as qualitatively heterogeneous: it includes phenomena, which pertain to various struc-
tural organizations and levels of regress of cognitive organization of consciousness;
which differ in degree of differentiation and symbolic mediation, emotional and moti-
vational investment and understanding of causal relations between one’s own and
other people intentions and behavior. We suggest considering two possible variants
of decreased level of mentalizing inside the phenomenon of psychic equivalence as
the consequence of structural regression of all cognitive-affective system to syncret
and complex. Thus, in the syncretic structure of mentalization shapelessness, diffuse-
ness and disarray of various impressions from the graphic perception of the Self and
the Other are domineering, fused into single perceptive image by a primitive affect;
this image is very unstable and mutable under the influence of random impressions
and immediate emotional states. We will refer here to the thought of L.S. Vygotsky,
according to whom, the lack of objective relations in syncret is replaced by the surplus
of subjective links, given in immediate perception and emotional impression [11]. In
their ultimate pathological manifestations in mentalization-syncret, the psychic and
the reality may not differ at all, they become equivalent to each other. Fantasies and
illusions are easily projected outwards and taken for really existing objects, so that
the state of anxiety is confused with the external threat and relived with all the force
of physical impact. The ultimate forms of syncretic organization of mentalization refer
to the most archaic layers of consciousness, when the “psychic” itself as the subjec-
tive has not been distinguished yet from the primary wholesome fusion in psychic
representation of psyche-reality, when the structure of this whole is homogeneous,
non-differentiated, which implies the absence of clear borders between the objective
and the subjective, the real and the hallucinatory, weak distinction of psychological
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borders of the Self and the Other, own fantasies, representations of the Other and real
states of this Other.
The diffuse structure of mentalization domineers in the altered states of conscious-
ness, in utter affective rapture, in PTSD shock as an immediate “switch-off” of the
ability to comprehend a traumatic experience, in the process of poetic work; it is
cultivated deliberately in some religious practices; in borderline personality organi-
zation it may indicate the psychotic level of disorder with reality testing impairment,
weak discernment of borders between instinctive fantasies, hallucinations and reality,
with some features of “magical thinking” in understanding causal links between own
desires and impulses and intentionality of behavior of another person [12; 13]. The
syncretic form of pre-mentalization may be understood as well as a consequence
of decay of systemic organization of the psychic, as a regress in functioning of the
whole system of consciousness to the most ontogenetically early, the “lowest” and
the “primitive” level, which corresponds to the “natural” and pre-conceptual orga-
nization of the consciousness as a whole. In this regime of functioning the real and
the imaginative, immediate perception of the “visual field”, sensory-motor cognition
and primary affects exist in coalescence, in syncretic and non-differentiated unity of
experience, when in consciousness the Self presents itself and the objective reality
(and the Other) not as separate entities, different from own hallucinations, but as a
fused and non-differentiated whole (“proto-We”, “one body, one soul for two”). This
form of consciousness, following Vygotsky, we may assign to its “primordial”, pre-
verbal form, “borderline” field between verbal consciousness and precognition, where
in the undivided primitive whole consciousness and precognition are fused, “primal”
and “secondary” processes may chaotically mix, and borders between them, even if
marked, may be easily “penetrable”, affects are “fleeting”, non-selective in their choice
of object of investment and are absolutely dependable on autochthonous instinctive
stimulation and sensory-motor activity. On this level of mentalization, unconscious
affective attitude “pro et contra” the Self and the Other is domineering; only the
simplest “good and bad” structuring of consciousness, only basic trust/ distrust is
available. Note that syncretic mentalization structure is widely produced in themodern
cultural stereotypes, for example, in the belief that “thought is material”, and “one
can read a person like a book”, in preference of symbiotic relationships. Inside the
integral mentalization structure, syncret creates the resource of intuitive and sensual-
emotional worldview.
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The complex mentalization structure, as compared to syncretic structure, attests for
the movement to more structure and differentiation of the psychic structure, for over-
coming “incoherent linkedness” and chaos of syncretic forms of thinking [11]. The
transition to unification and generalization, to integration of separate representations
of the Self and the Other becomes possible not only on the basis of subjective relations
and emotional impressions, but also on the basis of objective relations, upon experi-
ence of real interaction, which signifies the beginning of discovery of own subjectivity
and the autonomous world of the other person. However, the complex structure of
cognition imposes some restrictions on the opportunities of self-understanding, self-
identifications and representations of one’s own and other person’s subjectivity. In
terms of its complex organization, mentalization is limited to relations and links, which
are determined directly in the practical-operative experience of interaction with the
Other and on the basis of vivid-concrete and metaphorical thinking. The decrease
of the level of mentalization to over-concreteness may also manifest in “excessive
exactness” of the image of the Self and the Other, their equation to behavior in a
definite limited situation of interaction and resulting from this situation affective “col-
oring”, and in this sense – to “equivalence”. Complex mentalization, because of its lack
of generalization and “narrowing” of the meaning field, lacks structural stability: it
may turn into diffusion, indefinite and chaotic heaping of separate representations-
impressions of the Self and the Other. Further, it means dominance of situationally
colored partial and concrete images, which functioning is determined by pragmatic
motives and current moment, momentary interests and emotional states. Thus, com-
plex mentalizations represent “borderline” formations – they are not syncrets any
more, but not concepts yet (“pseudo-concepts”), not generalized and abstracted from
the concrete situation or an object, but sensually experienced separate qualities of
the Self and the Other, important for realization of a concrete activity in concrete
circumstances. One may say that the person, whose representations of the Self and
the Others are organized in the type of complex, is excessively rooted in their exis-
tential and sensually experienced situation, too dependent on actual emotional states
and pragmatic interests, can’t think the Other beyond one’s own intentional states,
autonomously and in all the entirety of the inherent individual traits of the Other and
their otherness. That is to say, complex mentalization of the Self and the Other is “tied”
to a concrete situation and because of that is partial, paradoxically can be both rigid
and mutable, is not differentiated enough from affects and perception, integrated on
the basis of the pre-conceptual generalization, whereby it is cognitively simplified,
narrowed and flattened, “alexithymic”. Along with that, such mentalization is “biased”,
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contradictory, because of the lack of differentiation of the need states, “fusion” with
them, and thus egocentric and susceptible to the “fleeting” emotional influences, one
may say, field-dependent – both from the external concrete situation and from the inner
impulses of the subject, who is “not free” from the environment and own affects,
can’t rise above them [14]. For the functioning of complex mentalization, the utter
field-dependency is common: narrowing of the possibilities to transcend the present,
empirical, immediately given, including by way of creative transformation, imagina-
tion, dream, when one may only come close to the subjective world, but never be
sure of its ultimate understanding. The lowering of the level of mentalization will
hinder the anticipation of the future, metaphoric reconstruction of the missing, lost,
and thus significantly lessens person’s resources for recovery, stabilizing the state of
chronic “emotional hunger”, constant discontent and search for instant gratification of
motives, fused with instinctive desires, in symbiotic relationships with the other as the
only source of “emotional inflow”. Low differentiation and lack of means for reflexive
analysis manifests in inability to notice subtle differences and conceive the Self and
the Other in the process of development and change (especially in the sphere of social
relationships and self-perception); in “dichotomy”, “non-dialecticity” of cognition as a
whole and intolerance of epistemological uncertainty. In psychotherapy of “difficult”
borderline and psychosomatic patients the abovementioned features of mentalization
determine the psychological mechanism of generalized resistance to treatment, sabo-
tage of cooperative relationships, and impose limitations to the patient’s ability to feel
relief and at least partial satisfaction from the therapeutic analysis and support (as a
verbal analogue to “containment”), compassion and supporting attitude of the Other
with the help of words, but not actions and “things”.
Many authors working in psychodynamic model of object relations and in other
frameworks notedmentalization deficit of borderline patients. Thus, according to some
of them, one may regard the lack of availability of the symbolization and meaning-
making processes as the main cognitive impairment in borderline and psychosomatic
personality disorders [15; 16]. The consequence of this “basic defect” is the distinctive
construction of the inner word, which is full of concrete events, but lacks “mental-
ity” – thoughts, ideas, fantasies, associations and metaphors, meanings and emo-
tional saturation [17; 18]. Besides all that, in light of this specific cognitive-emotional
defect the well-known mentalizational “paucity” can be understood – cognitive non-
differentiation of borderline and psychotic patients in psychological understanding of
their and other people’s mental world. French psychoanalysts call their inherent way of
thinking, understanding the world and attitude “operative thinking” [19], underlining
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its narrowness and pragmatism; it’s utterly simplified and static style of understanding
the Self and the Other. Mentalization processes, based on complex thinking, are also
lacking dynamic “flow” and flexibility in construal of affective life, which manifests in
incomprehension of principal incompleteness of understanding the Other – the subject
rejects the uncertainty of the situation of cognition, is intolerant to alternative variants
of understanding the feelings and intentions of the Other, except those based on
behavior and evident cause and effect relations. Mentalization, which is built on the
basis of complex thinking, may be viewed as a transitional form, borderline in its
structure and way of functioning between natural and cultural psychic function, which
lacks symbolic mediation, awareness and arbitrariness.
3.2. Impairment of motivation, goal-directedness and
sense-making function of mentalization
Peter Fonagy uses the term “pseudo-mentalization” (pretend, “as if”, imagined men-
talization) for the following diverse group of phenomena, underlining its ontogenetic
proximity to early forms of child play, when fantasy is split off from the factual situa-
tion.
From our point of view, the phenomenon of pseudo-mentalization is linked to prin-
cipal perversions of motivation and goal-directedness of the mentalization process,
which arise exclusively in the situation of close and emotionally saturated interac-
tion, and unconsciously create chaos, communicative dead-ends, double-binds, caus-
ing “narcissistic wounds” in personal communication and failures of therapeutic inter-
ventions [7; 20]. Such “impotency” of mentalizations becomes evident, whenwe trace
how these pre-categorical primitive structures, which have syncretic and complex
organization, manifest themselves in movement. The differences should show up in a
wider context of communication, in opportunity of cooperation with the Other on the
basis of mutual interest, trust, common motives and goals, “collective intentionality”
[1] and emotional investment.
Exclusive focus on one’s own autistic inner world and “absence” of the Other. By virtue
of the “split-off” from empirical experience, mentalization is replaced by a lifeless,
“devitalized”, utterly schematized image, devoid of genuine depth and felt emotion-
ality, having little to do with the Other in flesh and blood, present in relationships
here-and-now. That said, inner implicit schemes, which reflect own desires, beliefs,
a priori concepts, are subjectively so detached (to be exact – split off) from explicit,
empirically observed, situational contextual concepts, that it seems that one doesn’t
DOI 10.18502/kls.v4i8.3339 Page 820
The Fifth International Luria Memorial Congress
need real interaction with the other person – one knows well in advance, what this
Other feels and thinks. Abstract constructions, autisticmeanings and symbols take over
the objects of reality as represented by the empirical Other as the living flesh of social
cognition. While the complex character of mentalization reflects utter dependency
from environment, and syncretic variant reflects completemergewith it (equivalence),
in pseudo-mentalization, reality and subjectivity split off from each other so extremely
that the subject lives in their inner, fictional reality absolutely reserved and “over-field-
independently” from empirical reality of the Other. Psychological meaning of such
“deviation” from the normal goal of mentalizing may be explained on the assumption
of its unconscious function of defense from themeeting with indefinite and frightening
reality of the inner world of another person, which threatens one’s consciousness with
the appearance of traumatizing feelings for the vulnerable narcissically grandiose Self,
via their transformation with the help of over-idealization of the Self and devaluation
of the Other. The lack of “outside perspective” and “detachment” of representative
world from reality strips mentalization about oneself some sources of verification of
this rigid “theoretical” constructions. In its extreme forms, pseudo-mentalization may
be indicative of impairment of reality-testing, of altered state of consciousness, psy-
chotic level of functioning. Affective dumbness, aloofness, intellectual decay, derange-
ment of the whole behavior are structurally linked with disruption of social relations.
The loss of social relations (interpsychic communication), non-mediated by the talk-
dialogue with the Other, is interiorized in inner “muteness” – loss not only of under-
standing of others, but the disruption of meaningful inner and “verbalized” dialogue
with oneself, self-understanding. With the collapse of efforts to live in the regime of
pretence and failures to establish close interpersonal relationships, built on the basis
of fictitious representations of the Self and the Other, unconscious search of defensive
“refuge” in mysticism, religiosity, occultism and other paranormal cultural practices are
possible, though they can’t fill inner emptiness of emotions and meanings.
The second type of distortion of mentalizational motivation is also associated with
the displacement of its meaning and goal-directedness, but in this case in the “focus”
of understanding the Self and the Other lie purely concrete, bodily, physiological or
behavioral manifestations as facts of reality, and only they can serve as a ground
for utterly simplified and “truncated” representations. In psychotherapy this effect is
manifested in narrowing the possibilities for constructive change of innermental repre-
sentations and urgent demand from the therapist to present “effective” and “factual”
proves of therapy efficiency, of his/her professionalism, sincerity, commitment and
“love”, prompting (manipulating and forcing) violation of the therapeutic borders and
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direct sexual actions. Patients with borderline personality disorder are satisfied with
the results of the treatment only if they are certified with the external, perceptible,
“material” and pragmatic changes in their life – immediately, “here-and-now”. They
don’t trust words and feelings of the Other, but rely only on the visual facts and
only when behavior of the other people meet completely their unrealistic infantile
and perfectionist projects (rags-to-riches), dreams of love, beauty, glory, immediate
transformation of looks or fate. Possibilities of mentalization as a symbolic way of
representation (and accordingly – change) of subjective are extremely limited here; in
its structural organization such a mentalization is close to syncretic and complex, pre-
mentalization level. Its dysfunction is manifested in replacement of symbolization by
impulsive behavioral or psychosomatic reacting (“acting out”), in immersion into bod-
ily hypochondriac or perfectionist-narcissistic fixations, in self-harming behavior, and
notably these actions and bodily states are not mediated by meaning, not expressed
in word, and pre-verbal layers of consciousness-feeling are “split off” from the layer
of meaning. Emotions that accompany representations of the Self and the Other are
“alexithymic”, cognitively non-mediated, impulsive, intense and polarized.
The third variant of deviation of mentalizational motivation – mentalization abuse –
is an unconscious use of mentalization for purposes of control or harming other per-
son. This dysfunction becomes possible due to the lack of the feeling of subjectivity,
detachment of mentalizational experience from values and normative representations
about autonomous significance of the subjective world of the Other. The “inception”
into thoughts and feelings of the Other via primitive defense mechanism of projective
identification gives a clue to understanding the role of manipulation as communica-
tive violence, which blocks mentalization processes. Chronification of psychological
violence, for example in the form of manipulative style of parental attitude or school
bulling, is interiorized in stable basic deficits of mentalization as psychological “armor”
from subjectively unbearable traumatic experiences. It may be suggested further, that
the loss of the ability to psychically imagine (and not mechanically act and stereotyp-
ically reproduce in memory) emotionally significant events, symbolically (and not via
immediate reacting or all-potent control) “contain” and process psychological traumas,
is the result of fragility of identity and lack of means and ways of inner autonomous
and formed system of symbolic self-regulation. Mentalization via manipulation, which
differs in level of its structural organization, in its way of functioning is closer to natural
function, externally organized and wholly dependent on narcissistic mirroring view of
the Other, “used” only for detoxication of hostility and compensation of deficit.
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4. Conclusion
Let’s formulate some interim results of the study of the problem. Mentalization of the
mature person unfolds in its development to a more differentiated, elaborate, cogni-
tively and symbolically mediated, affectively balanced representative system, able to
organize and “withhold” contradictory and emotionally ambivalent experience of the
“Self-Other” relationships. On the contrary, impairments of mentalizational structural-
functional system are due to the mechanism of de-differentiation/ disintegration of
representations of subjective world of the Self and the Other, prevailing and fusion of
extremes of syncretic and diffuse “merges” of desires, affects and situations and / or
complete split-off of over-abstract representations from sensually experienced reality
of the human world.
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